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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78 ,?-2, ami pun si i, 1111,  
to Utah R. App. P. 3, 4. 
DESCRIPTIONS OF AND REFERENCES TO PARTIES 
Plaintiff/Ar; . International (" I MI ) a I Jtah corporation, 
who purchased the subject alarm system from defendants/appellees. 
Defendants Eagle Security Corporation, Alert One and Grant Ashby 
(collectively "Eagle") are the persons or entities or successors of persons or entities 
who (Irsigned and installed diir subjai .darm system. I MI has settled its claims 
against Eagle and Eagle is not a party to this appeal, Defendanl Appellee Ai (itm 
Alarm, Inc., dba ACM U.L. Monitoring Station ("ACM") is an Arizona corporation 
who accepted and monitored the subject alarm system which Eagle installed. 
ISSUE, STANDARD UF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF RECORD 
1. The sole issue TMI presents is whether the dish id 1 ouri ened dismissing 
TMFs claims for joint venture liability between Eagle and ACM as a matter of law, on 
summary judgment. 
2. On iippi til I10111 .in uidci jjnmimn Minimal v judgment the issue is 
reviewed for correctness without deference to the district court IInt 1t ; (iulvtka, 
933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). 
The Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
. 1 -
most favorable to TMI, the non-moving party. Harline v. Baker, 912 P.2d 433, 435 
(Utah 1996). 
3. TMI filed a brief opposing ACM's motion for summary judgment on the 
issue with appropriate identification of disputed facts and citations to the record. 
Record ("R.") at 323-44. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS 
This case arises from a fire which occurred at TMI's commercial manufacturing 
facility in July 1995. Prior to the fire, TMI was concerned for the safety and security 
of the facility and valuable equipment therein, and had purchased what was represented 
to be a fully monitored fire and burglar alarm system. Despite the alarm system, the 
subject fire started and burned in the manufacturing portion of the building for 
approximately an hour before it was eventually detected by a security guard who 
finally noticed flames outside the building. R. at 139-45. 
In connection with its design and installation of the fire alarm system, Eagle 
told TMI the system it designed and installed would be monitored was "minimally 
adequate." Unfortunately, the system was not "minimally adequate," but was 
dangerously defective. Id. at 140-42, 348-49. Further, in addition to the 
representation the system was "minimally adequate," Eagle told TMI that Eagle would 
provide "ILL. central station monitoring," which was if fact "subcontracted" to ACM, an 
out-of-state monitoring company. Id. 
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TMI's Firsi Aiiinidnl l 'nmplaml asserted that the monitoring company, ACM, 
was liable for negligence in its own right, and was .ilso liablt; as a IOIIII \ niiun i in ,i 
joint enterprise with Eagle. Id. at pp. 145-47. After discovery, ACM moved for 
summary judgment on both claims, arguing it was neither negligent nor liable as a 
joifii " niturci as a uuttn ml lavi hi al 
The district court denied ACM's motion negligent 
in its own right, but granted the motion as to TMI's claims asserting joint venture 
liability. Id. at TMI has now settled claims other than the joint venture claim 
which liagk: «uul A( 'M, 1 those claims were dismissed with 
predjudice. TMI then filed this appeal from the Distriri (Vui i \ ^\wk\ of piiiiul 
summary judgment on the joint venture issue. Addendum at Tabs A-C.x 
FACTS RELATING PARTICULARLY TO TMI'S JOINT VENTURE CLAIM 
1. £ag|e jq,rCseiital (<P I Ml i! would design and install at TMI's premises a 
fire and burglary detection system "with central station ring." Id al 140. 
2. Eagle, by itself, did not have the capability to provide the central station 
monitoring functions required by such a system. Accordingly, Eagle arranged for 
'TMI filed an earlier appeal after a stipulated dismissal of remaining claims without 
prejudice. Upon the Court's suggestion the dismissal without prejudice constituted a non-
final order, TMI voluntarily dismissed the appeal and re-filed the action in order to settle the 
remaining claims and achieve a final order, from which this appeal is brought. 
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ACM to provide the central station monitoring function in return for a portion of the 
monthly fee Eagle charged TMI for the system. 
The agreement between Eagle and ACM provides in pertinent part: 
1. The installer [Eagle] is engaged in the business of 
equipping, furnishing and installing alarm protective devices and intends 
to enter into agreements with customers (hereinafter called "the 
Subscribers") for the Company [ACM] to provide monitoring service for 
said installed devices as outlined in the Monitoring Service Request 
Agreement.. . . [Eagle] shall provide [ACM] in writing the services to 
be provided to each Subscriber before [ACM's] acceptance of such 
subscriber. 
2. [ACM] agrees to provide monitoring and notification 
services and [Eagle] agrees to pay to [ACM] pursuant to the current price 
list in effect at the time Installer's Subscriber [TMI] is to be put on line 
for monitoring service, and be subject to any future price increases. 
Service for each subscriber shall be paid for a period of one year or 
more. . . . 
4. Any fees paid by [Eagle] for services provided a Subscriber 
shall not be refundable. 
11. [Eagle] agrees to pay all for any licenses and all sales, use 
or business taxes or imposition by municipal, state and /or Federal 
authorities in connection with the services to be performed by [ACM] 
and [Eagle] agrees to hold [ACM] harmless from, and to indemnify it 
against, any claims for the foregoing. 
Id. at 293. 
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3. Before monitoring the system, ACM had to test and accept the equipment 
installed by Eagle: 
Q. And why is it that you require this verification and testing 
of signals [prior to putting an account on line]? 
A. Because it aids in the timeliness of our dispatch. If a dealer 
[Eagle] doesn't test through everything that he as 
programmed into the panel, and, later, we get a signal that 
wasn't identified by him on his paperwork to us, it's an 
unidentified signal. We don't know what it is. It could be 
a fire. It could be a burglary. It could be just a trouble 
signal. 
We have to take the time to page that dealer, try to 
get information before we can do anything. We try very 
diligently to get the dealers to test all the signals that they've 
programmed into the panels initially so that we never have 
that kind of a mishap. . . . 
Deposition of Karen Kohn at p. 35; R.at 328. ACM admitted: 
Installation test signals were run through plaintiffs alarm system to 
Action Alarm [ACM] as this is the standard operating procedure for new 
subscribers. This testing ensures that the alarm system is adequately 
working and is capable of transmitting proper signals to Action Alarm's 
central monitoring station. 
R.at 257. 
4. To provide the monitoring function, ACM had business and personal 
telephone numbers of TMI's management personnel, and had direct contact with TMI 
regarding the system anytime TMI made a call concerning the system or when there 
was a false alarm: 
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A. . . . Many times, the end user [TMI] will call us because 
they have the number. They have the number, because they 
need to call us if they need to cancel an alarm or whatever. 
And if its just something relating to their system, we just 
simply tell them that we will have the technician call them, 
and the technician is their alarm company. 
Depo. of Karen Kohn at pp. 33-34; R. at 332. 
5. But both ACM and Eagle give customers the impression ACM and Eagle 
are the same entity: 
Q. Do you — you heard Ms. Kohn's testimony that you [ACM] 
identifies itself as the dealer [Eagle]? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So how do you tell them [a subscriber like TMI] that 
they've got to speak with the dealer [in the event of a 
problem]? 
A. We tell them they need to speak with a technician, which 
none of us are, and we would be happy to contact one, or 
page them, or they can call the front office and get one 
themselves. 
Q. Okay. To your knowledge, do you ever inform the end 
user [of the alarm system] about the fact that your 
relationship is only with the dealer and not with them? 
A. We have no communication with the end user other than to 
respond to an alarm. 
Q. So the answer is, there is no notification to the end user? 
A. Correct. 
-6-
Deposition of Maria Malice at pp. 24-25; R. at 5. ACM's promotional materials 
provide in pertinent part: 
Anytime we contract your [Eagle's] subscriber, we identify ourselves as your 
company. 
A customer is the most important person. A customer can be an alarm 
dealer or an alarm subscriber. He is not dependent on us. We are 
dependent on him. 
Depo. of Karen Cohn at Exhibit "1," pp. 75, 90 (emphasis added); R.at 335. 
7. Although ACM purports to limit its responsibility for monitored alarm 
systems with its dealers, ACM does not inform customers of the limitations: 
Q. Do you ever notify the end user that there's this limitation 
of liability with the dealer? 
A. That's the dealer's responsibility. 
Q. Do you feel like it's something they should do, or it - when 
you say "responsibility" what do you mean? 
A. Well, they should have a limit of liability in their own 
contracts, and it's their responsibility to do that. 
Q. Is that something you request them to do? 
A. No. Its standard practice in the industry. 
Depo. of Maria Malice at p. 37; R. at 332-33. 
8. Pursuant to the arrangement between itself and Eagle, ACM retained the 
right to control whether it would monitor the system Eagle installed at TMI: 
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3. Service to any subscriber shall become effective only (a) 
when [ACM] shall have received a completed Monitoring Service request 
Agreement and (b) when [Eagle] shall have sent an acceptable test signal 
on the monitoring equipment provided by [Eagle] for the such Subscriber 
for each condition which is proposed be monitored for such Subscriber 
and said test signals have been received and acknowledged by [ACM] as 
acceptable. . . . 
7. This Agreement may be suspended, at [ACM's] option, as 
to any subscriber should the protective equipment on the premises of such 
subscriber become so disabled or so substantially damaged that further 
service to such subscriber is impracticable. 
R. at 293. 
9. TMI produced evidence that, in fact, based upon the information ACM 
had about TMI's system through its testing with Eagle, ACM should have, but failed, 
to exercise this control in the instant case: 
9. Pursuant to ACM's requirements, Eagle gave ACM a great deal of 
pertinent information about the system at plaintiffs facility. Significantly, 
Eagle informed ACM that the system was in a commercial facility. The account 
thus required certain features to be employed by Eagle and monitored by ACM 
in order to ensure its functionality as a "commercial fire alarm account." 
10. Commercial fire alarm accounts generally involve larger risks and 
require additional safeguards over and above non-commercial fire alarm 
installations. For example, any commercial fire alarm installation should have: 
(a) control panels and equipment specified for the intended use; (b) a 24 hour 
test signal to the central station; (c) dual phone line monitoring to the central 
station; (d) trouble reporting information to the central station; (e) supervisory 
reporting information to the central station; (f) no undefined zone literal 
information at the central station. 
11. Either through a series of account application forms, or through 
testing, Eagle gave ACM information from which ACM either did know or 
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should have known the alarm system at plaintiffs facility failed to conform to 
ACM's own standards and industry standards: (a) the system had control panels 
installed that were listed or specified for household use only; (b) there was one 
digital account number programmed for two independent systems; (c) there was 
undefined and improper zone information on the account; (d) there was no 
supervisory or trouble information provided to the central station; (e) there was 
single telephone line reporting to the central station; (f) there was no secondary 
digital receiver number programed to the central station; and (g) there was no 
24-hour test signal at the central station. 
12. This and other information discussed below was provided to or 
available to ACM prior to the fire at plaintiffs facility, and the information 
indicated the system was defective, improperly installed and likely to give 
unpredictable and inconsistent results. Based upon this information, ACM 
should not have monitored the system and allowed it to operate and be 
monitored as a commercial fire alarm system. 
13. The subject alarm system utilized two control panels installed at 
plaintiffs facility to communicate critical detection and supervisory information 
from plaintiffs facility to ACM by existing phone lines. Neither control panel 
was destroyed in the fire, and I was able to examine the control panels that had 
been programmed by Eagle to provide the information to ACM. 
14. Both control panels were listed or specified for household use 
only, and thus were inappropriate for use in plaintiffs commercial 
manufacturing facility. In addition, based upon my examination of the system I 
determined it was improperly programmed, and was in fact programmed in a 
way the manufacturer of the control panel warned might give "unpredictable 
results." Based upon my examination and review of the control panel 
programming, the control panels could not have and did not provide or report 
the proper signals to ACM either when the account was put on line or at the 
time of the fire. 
15. ACM's own policies and procedures required that all 
signals sent by control panels be tested before an account is put on line. 
Based upon my examination of the panels and my findings described 
above, I believe Eagle and ACM either did not test the alarm system at 
plaintiffs facility, or tested it improperly, or ignored the indications of 
improper programming the testing procedure demonstrated. 
- 9 -
Affidavit of Jeffery Zwirn at 11 13-15; R. at 349-50. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue of whether a joint venture exists is generally a question of fact not 
appropriate for disposition on summary judgment. Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 
P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987). This is especially true where the non-moving party 
presents evidence on the requirements of joint venture, which the Supreme Court has 
described as follows: "The requirements for the [joint venture relationship] are not 
exactly defined but certain elements are essential: The parties must combine their 
property, money, effects, skill, labor and knowledge." Id. quoting Basset v. Baker, 
530 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1974). 
Here, TMI presents evidence the alarm system TMI bought and continued to 
pay for was a folly monitored alarm system, and ACM would not have a system to 
monitor without Eagle and Eagle could not provide the monitoring without ACM. In 
that single system, ACM and Eagle combined Eagle's installation equipment and 
Eagle's time, labor and knowledge used in the installation with ACM's monitoring 
equipment, monitoring services and ACM's time, labor and knowledge utilized during 
monitoring to provide a fully monitored yet dangerously defective system. 
Such evidence is sufficient to allow a factual finding of joint enterprise sufficient 
to impose joint venture liability, and summary judgment on the issue is inappropriate, 
as other courts reaching the issue have recognized. Hunter v. BPS Guard Services, 
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Inc., 654 N.E.2d 405, 418-20 (Ohio App. 1995) (reversing summary judgment for 
alarm monitoring company on claim of joint venture with alarm installer). 
ARGUMENT 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT TMFS 
CLAIM OF A JOINT ENTERPRISE AND FOR JOINT 
VENTURE LIABILITY BETWEEN ACM AND EAGLE, AND 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IGNORING SUCH 
EVIDENCE AND ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, NO 
CAUSE OF ACTION, ON THE CLAIMS SHOULD BE 
REVERSED. 
The issue of joint venture liability is generally a question of fact not appropriate 
for disposition on summary judgment: 
Whether a joint venture exists is, however, a question of fact. In Strand 
v. Craney, 607 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 1980), we stated: 
Whether a joint venture exists is ordinarily a question of 
fact. On review of factual determinations, this court will 
sustain a decision that is based on findings supported by 
substantial evidence. The evidence is to be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party. 
Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d, 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). 
This is especially true where there is evidence supporting each of the elements 
necessary for imposition of such liability. Utah courts have described those elements 
as follows: 
The elements of a joint enterprise are: 
"(1) An agreement, express or implied, among the members of the 
group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a 
community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the 
- 1 1 -
members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the 
enterprise, which gives an equal right of control." 
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Utah App. 1997) (citations 
omitted); Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d, 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987) ("The 
requirements for the [joint venture relationship] are not exactly defined but certain 
elements are essential: The parties must combine their property, money, effects, skill, 
labor and knowledge.") (quoting Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974)).2 
Application of the elements described by the Utah Court in Farmers to the facts 
here, particularly when those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to TMI, 
supports imposition of joint venture liability between ACM and Eagle. For example: 
2And as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
For a harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of 
another, one is subject to liability if he 
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or 
pursuant to a common design with him, or 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a 
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance 
or encouragement to the other so to conduct 
himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in 
accomplishing the tortious result and his own 
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a 
breach of duty to the third person. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts at § 876. 
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(1) there is an express agreement between ACM and Eagle to provide a fully 
monitored alarm system at TMI's premises; (2) ACM and Eagle shared a common 
purpose to provide TMI with the fully monitored alarm system which TMI bought and 
was paying both Eagle and ACM for on a monthly basis; (3) ACM and Eagle shared a 
common pecuniary interest in the monthly monitoring of the alarm system by sharing 
the monthly monitoring fee between them; and (4) ACM had control of the monthly 
monitoring pursuant to its own contract with Eagle and by testing and approving the 
system and retaining the right not to monitor the system if its testing and approvals 
were not met. Compare Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker, 936 P.2d at 1090 (listing four 
emphasized elements as the requisites for imposition of joint enterprise liability). 
Simply put, the alarm system TMI bought and continued to pay for was a fully 
monitored alarm system, and ACM would not have a system to monitor without Eagle 
and Eagle could not provide the monitoring without ACM. In that single system, 
ACM and Eagle combined Eagle's installation equipment and Eagle's time, labor and 
knowledge used in the installation with ACM's monitoring equipment, monitoring 
services and ACM's time, labor and knowledge utilized during monitoring to provide a 
fully monitored yet dangerously defective system. 
Such circumstances are sufficient to allow a factual finding of joint enterprise 
sufficient to impose joint venture liability. Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d, 
1029, 1032 (Utah 1987) ("The requirements for the [joint venture relationship] are not 
- 1 3 -
exactly defined but certain elements are essential: The parties must combine their 
property, money, effects, skill, labor and knowledge."). And on similar facts in 
Hunter v. BPS Guard Services, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 405, 418-20 (Ohio App. 1995), the 
court reversed summary judgment for the alarm monitoring company, noting: 
[B]ecause of the relationship between Certified [the alarm installer] and 
Guardian [the monitoring company], there is a question of fact as to 
whether the parties were separate, independent entities or whether the 
parties were engaged in a joint venture. As such, the trial court erred in 
determining, as a matter of law, that the parties were [not] engaged in a 
joint venture and appellant's fifth assignment of error is well taken. 
654N.E.2dat419. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the trial court's decision dismissing TMFs claims 
for joint enterprise liability as a matter of law on summary judgment was erroneous. 
The case should be remanded for further proceedings in the district court on such 
claims. 
DATED this / ' ^ d a y of December, 2000. 
WEISS BERRETT£ETTY, L.C. 
c 
By: 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Appellant Trace Minerals 
International 
F \Everyone\Clients\Rob\Alhed\Trace Minerals v Eagle Secunty\APPEAL BRF 
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Henry E. Heath #1441 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




EAGLE SECURITY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, its successor-in-interest, 
ALERT ONE, a Utah Corporation, GRAN' 
ASHBY, and JANE DOES, individuals, an-
ACTION ALARM, INC., dba 
ACM U.L. MONITORING S : M, 
' •. • proration. 
I I 'VKl lAL MiAliU \R\ JIJ 1M.;L\1 KIN f 
Civil No. 960900386 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for heari*^ r uw mt motion of detendant Action ?\,u\ 
LTL Monitoring Station ("Action *\irm .• for summary judgment on the 14* day of October, 1998 
before the Honorable Roger S. Dutson, District Judge, with the parties appearing by counsel. 
The court having received and reviewed the pleadings and having heard oral arguments of the 
parties and being fully advised in the premises and having considered the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff nevertheless found that reasonable minds could not differ that there 
was no joint enterprise between and among defendants and Action Alarm is not liable for the 
fault, if any, of Eagle Security and the court therefore does 
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE that plaintiffs claims of joint enterprise against 
defendant Action Alarm be and the same hereby are dismissed with prejudice. 
FURTHER ORDER that plaintiffs claims against Action Alarm based upon the 
2 
all ;gations of the s Die negligence of Abiion Alarm be and the same hereby are reserved for trial. 
DA I ED this ^ da] of > ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ 9 9 8 . 
BYTBE-eCURT 
Roger S^ Dutson 
District Court Judge 
IZsUC^zA^ 
^ -^Ajpproved a|s to Form: 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorney for PlaintiiV 
Stacey H/^ullivan 
Attorney for Defendant Eagle Secuiirif 
2305.898 
3 
?H& DISTKiiiJ CO«i"I": 
ROBERT C. KELLER [A48611 
WEISS BERRETT PL T"i 
Attorney for Trace Minerals ; 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 530 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)531-7733 
Facsimile: (801)531-7711 
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EAGLE SECURITY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, its successor-in-interest. 
ALERT ONE, a Utah corporation. GRANT 
ASHBY, and JANE DOES, individuals, and 
ACTION ALARM. INC., dba ACM U.L. 




ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION AND 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
Judge Michael :.: . 
jpon :he stipulation and motion of the parties filed herewith, and for good cause 
ORDERED. ADJUDGED, AND DL:v_RLE! • 
consolidated with tha: previous!} r ' J -,--• •:•,J;-;, MTX ...vii No.?60900386, 
vious 
discover, nacerials and previous rulings by the Court; and (2) this consolidated action. EXHIBIT 
including all remaining claims and cross-claims, be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice 
pending resolution of certain issues on appeal. 
DATED this /3 day of March, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Michael DH^n 
Michael D. Lyon 
District Court Judge 
PETTY, L.C. 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STRONG & HANNI 
Jfenry E. H^ 
Attorneys4or Defendant Action Alarm 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
d 
By Miaou 
Stacey H. Simivan 
Attorneys for Defendants Eagle Security 
and Grant Ashbv 
F »Evcryonc\CIienis\Rob\Ailicd\Tr3ce Minerals v Eagle SccumvDlSMISS2 ORD *fHl 
. * > . 
ROBERT C. KELLER [A4861 ] 
WEISS BERRETT PETTY, L.C. 
Attorney for Trace Minerals Intei luminal 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 530 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City Utah 341-U 
Telephone: (801) 531 "*" : 
Facsimile CSOH - ' ' 1 
V 
STATE 01 LlAi, 




EAGLE SECURITY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, its successor-in-interest. I 
ALERT ONE, a Utah corporation. GRANT j 
ASHBY, and JANE DOES, individuals, and j 
ACTION ALARM. INC.. dba ACM U.L. 1 
MONITORING STATION, an Arizona | 
corporation. 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 000900735PD 
Judse Michael D. Lvon 
1
 i I ' I I I . I i IN.1 '..";. '!)y i j iv. I ' l iM I " , , J , i | j , . ' ! , 1 , , ' ir 
Court's Order of Partial Summary Judgment entered on November 1"/,
 iyy> 
final for purposes of appeal on this Court's Order of Consolidation and Dismissal with 
Predjudice entered on or about June 13, 2000. 
DATED this 2-0 day of June, 2000. 
WEISS BERRETT PETTY, LC. 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ Vp 'day of June, 2000,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Stacey H. Sullivan 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
4543 South 700 East #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Henry E. Heath 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
N
 L 
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